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Basic Terminology
Cryptology: All-inclusive term used for the study of secure
communications over non-secure channels and related
problems.
Cryptography: The process of designing systems (ciphers,
cryptosystems) to realize secure communications over
non-secure channels.
Cryptoanalysis: discipline of breaking the crypto systems.
Coding Theory: Deals with representing the information
using codes. It covers: compression, secrecy, and
error-correction.
Unencrypted data is called plaintext (cleartext); Encrypted
data is called ciphertext
key: string of digits that acts as a password. Only the
intended receivers should have the key that transforms the
ciphertext into plaintext.
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Security Requirements
Confidentiality: protection from disclosure to unauthorized
persons
Integrity: maintaining data consistency
Authentication: assurance of identity of person or originator
of data
Non-repudiation: originator of communications cannot deny
it later
Availability: legitimate users have access when they need it
Access Control: unauthorized users are kept out
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Kerckhkoffs’ Principle
While assessing the strength of a cryptosystem, one should always
assume that the enemy knows the cryptographic algorithm used.
The security of the system, therefore, should be based (and
analyzed) on:
• the quality (strength) of the algorithm but not its obscurity
• the key space (or key length)
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Mathematics comes into the play: “(How) To encrypt or
(how) not to encrypt, that is the question”
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Data Encryption Standard
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Hey, where’s the math in these... pictures?
Every such cryptosystem can be described by a system of
(nonlinear) equations
Challenge: Solve it/them, or show that it’s... hard to do that.
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New attack on Bluetooth E0
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Here’s one equation describing E0
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Attacks on E0
Armknecht and Krause [2003] - algebraic attack on Bluetooth
E0; 269 operations
Lu and Vaudenay [2004] - correlation attack; 237 operations
Petrakos, Dinolt, Michael and Stanica [2009] cube attack;
221 operations
Cube attack: Proposed by Dinur & Shamir (2008)
Thesis Research Topics: apply the cube attack to ECRYPT
eStream project ciphers (like GRAIN-128)
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All cryptosystems based on a “difficult” mathematical
part...
Shannon (Communication theory of secrecy systems, Bell
Systems Tech. J. 28, (1949), 656–715) proposed two criteria:
* Diffusion: one character change in the plaintext should
effect as many ciphertext characters as possible;
* Confusion: The key should not relate to the ciphertext in a
“simple” way.
Impose some criteria to S-boxes or combiners to respect these
principles: balancedness, high avalanche features, high
nonlinearity, correlation immunity, algebraic immunity, etc.
Unfortunately, there are trade-offs among these criteria!
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Crypto properties of S-boxes
Can one find large classes of Boolean functions that satisfy
one and hopefully more of these criteria?
Collaborations between researchers in various areas is
warranted: I mention my collaboration with Jon T. Butler
(ECE) who’s an expert in reconfigurable computing (SRC-6),
to enumerate and find Boolean functions with good ”crypto”
properties;
How hard can it be to perform the search through the entire
space?
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FPGA vc. PC Computational Complexity
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Advanced Encryption Standard
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Masking AES
“Side-channel attacks” can compromise implementations of
cryptographic algorithms, including AES.
Such attacks use statistics of phenomena such as timing,
power, or electromagnetic radiation, to infer the secret key.
One countermeasure is to add random data at each step, to
randomize these statistics; this is called masking.
Here is a glimpse of the mathemagic that makes it work.
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AES Algorithm
AES is a symmetric 128-bit block cipher:
from 128, 192, or 256 bit key, generate a different 128-bit
round key for each of 10, 12, or 14 rounds;
process each block by rounds:
round 0 : Add Round Key.




round n : Substitute Bytes;
Shift Rows;
Add Round Key.
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Nonlinearity/Complexity
of the four steps:
the steps Shift Rows, Mix Columns, & Add Round Key are
linear operations (and easy)
the Substitute Bytes function is nonlinear due to the inverse
operation in the 8-bit field, and is complicated to compute.
The Substitute Bytes step itself comprises two substeps; for
each 8-bit byte a:
1 Inverse: Find c = a−1, the inverse in the 8-bit field;
2 Affine: Then the output is s = M c⊕ b.
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field: definition
A field is a set of numbers with the operations of addition,





Galois showed that one can also have fields with a finite number of
elements. Some examples:
modulo 2: {0, 1} where 1⊕ 1 = 0
field of 8-bit bytes, as used in AES
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Subfield Representation
The trick that makes masking work nicely is using subfields. . .
standard
for the 8-bit field: A = a7x7 + · · ·+ a1x + a0,
where each ai is one bit and x
8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 = 0.
subfield
for the 8-bit field: A = A1x + A0,
where Ai are in the 4-bit field and x
2 + x + 8 = 0;
then for the 4-bit field: A = a1x + a0,
where ai are in the 2-bit field and x2 + x + 3 = 0;
then for the 2-bit field: a = a1x + a0,
where ai are in the 1-bit field and x
2 + x + 1 = 0.
Notation: A in the 8-bit field; A in the 4-bit field; a in the 2-bit
field; a in the 1-bit field
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Inversion using subfields
without masking
Inversion in the 8-bit field involves one inversion and several
multiplications and additions in the 4-bit field.
Inversion in the 4-bit field involves one inversion and several
multiplications and additions in the 2-bit field.
Inversion in the 2-bit field is just a bit swap:
Given: c = [c0 , c1]
Result: c−1 = [c1 , c0]
Note: Inversion in the 2-bit field is linear
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Masked Inversion
1 add a random mask in the 8-bit field
2 in the 4-bit field and the 2-bit field, add mask “corrections”
for the multiplications
3 for the inversion in the 2-bit field, just swap the two bits of
the mask
Then all operations remain masked and every intermediate result is
statistically random!
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Algebraic Attacks on AES
AES is defined by relatively simple algebraic equations in finite
fields. Consequently, there has been much research in ways to
solve the system of nonlinear equations, to find the secret key.
Courtois et al. attacked small versions of AES, using
equations in the field of bits. The method involved doing
linear algebra, but on the nonlinear terms.
Cid et al. also attacked small versions of AES, but using many
fewer equations, in the field of bytes. The method applied
standard tools for solving polynomial equations.
Raddum and Semaev developed a whole new way of
representing nonlinear equations over finite fields, called
MRHS equations, which was orders of magnitude faster, for
certain special cases.
Our current work explores ways to make this new approach
more efficient. . .
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What else is there to increase the complexity of
cryptosystems?
Hmmm... invent other systems!
Working with arithmetic on algebraic curves Go ;
Working in a world where a · b is not the same as b · a
(non-commutative structures);
Quantum environments.
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Go back ;
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Theorem (David Canright & Pante Stanica)
Thank you for your attention.
Proof.
No proof required!
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